Labor Secretary Francis Perkins, saw the NIRA as a device to raise wages and worker purchasing power, thereby increasing economic output.9
Because of these mixed motivations, the NIRA's preamble is mainly a promise of promoting "cooperation" to bring about economic recovery. There is, however, specific reference to increasing "the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power,"10 although the statute does not state whose purchasing power was to be raised. President Roosevelt, upon signing the bill into law, indicated that while the wage increases promoted by the law would raise production costs, businesses should "give first consideration to the improvement of operating figures . .. to be expected from the rising purchasing power of the public."" Thus, the intent seemed to be to increase wages relative to prices, thereby raising real wages and purchasing power.
There are-to be sure-ambiguities concerning the economic theories underlying the early New Deal programs. The President's inaugural observation that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself' reflected a conviction that building confidence was the key to ending the Depression. Presumably, however, business confidence would be buoyed more by an increase in prices relative to wages than by the reverse. Moreover, a consistent theme of price inflation ran through the early New Deal (although "reflation" was the preferred term).
At the most fundamental level, there was the uncontroverted fact that prices had fallen substantially since 1929. From 1929 to 1933, retail prices declined by 27 percent.12 This observation was apparently used as a justification for raising prices. It was argued that if prices could be raised back to 1929 levels, production would also rise to its 1929 peak. It is not clear whether a distinction was made between alternative means of raising prices. Reflation through NIRA cartel agreements on pricing or through adjusting the dollar value of gold was thought to be as promising as monetary expansion. In the words of Warren and Pearson, whose peculiar theories of gold and prices lay behind the President's gold policies: "Inflation results in unusual business activity. Deflation stops business."'3
The original version of the Wagner bill, submitted as the "Labor Disputes Act" in March 1934, did not in its preamble relate the proposed law to economic recovery. Like the Norris-LaGuardia Act it merely concentrated on the issue of equalizing "the bargaining power 9. See id. at 190-91. 10. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, ? 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933) .
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of employers and employees."14 However, Senator Wagner, in introducing the bill, stated that such balancing was "necessary to insure a wise distribution of wealth. . . , to maintain a full flow of purchasing power, and to prevent recurrent depressions."15 The NIRA, he indicated, was not having the desired effect of boosting real wages "upon which permanent prosperity must rest."16 Indeed, he declared, failure to pass the Wagner bill would "jeopardize the whole recovery program." 17 Senator Wagner's wage-purchasing power justification appears to have been widely accepted. It was noted correctly that the upward pressure on wages induced by the NIRA had been offset by corresponding price boosts.18 The Wagner bill was intended to tilt the bias toward wages more successfully than had the NIRA. Not surprisingly, the wage-purchasing power theory was supported by organized labor; it was (and to some extent remains) a traditional justification of the labor movement for raising wages.19 To the extent the justification was criticized, the criticisms came from employers.
Employers who gave testimony before Congress on the Wagner bill made various arguments against its passage. They argued that the Act's effort to balance the bargaining power of labor and management falsely presupposed a "fundamental theory of. . . class antagonism"; that since U.S. wages were already higher than those in countries where unions were more prevalent, it was evident that unions could not raise wages further; and that Congress should stimulate investment rather than consumption.20 These protests, however, were of no avail. By February 1935, the full exposition of the wage-purchasing power theory had entered the proposed bill's preamble. The Wagner Act was to be an exercise in improving macroeconomic performance by creating micro-level conditions conducive to raising wages.
External views of the Wagner Act's wage-purchasing power theory.
Although the Wagner theory did not seem particularly controversial in Congress, the view that pushing up wages would stimulate output and employment was by no means uniformly accepted in the academic 14 community. Economist Edward Mason of Harvard wrote of the "crudity of the errors" of NRA administrators who believed in recovery via wage increases.21 However, empirically oriented economists-as opposed to theoreticians-were more receptive to the NIRA view. A Brookings study published in 1936, while conceding that contemporary economists were split on the wage theory, cautiously indicated that "expansion of purchasing power among the masses is a primary essential to sustained prosperity." On the other hand, the book argued, boosting real wages would not ensure "permanent prosperity." 22 Actually, what strikes the moder reader most is the general absence of economic data in these discussions. It was widely accepted that there had been an increase in profits in the late 1920s and that this had led to a decline in consumption. Information available now (but not necessarily readily obtainable then) indicates that although there was a profit expansion, real consumption also rose steadily during the 1920s.23 Moreover, from 1929 to 1933, real investment fell absolutely by as much as real consumption even though investment accounted for only 18 percent of real GNP in 1929 while consumption accounted for 68 percent.24 In a world in which unemployment-the key problem facing the country in the 1930s-went largely unmeasured, it is hardly surprising that the debate on the wage-purchasing power theory was largely nonempirical. Debaters were free to indulge their prejudices without fear of contradiction by statistical analyses.
The role that monetary policy might have played in causing or exacerbating the Depression, or in engineering a recovery from it, was largely neglected. Economist Lauchlin Currie, writing in 1934, did blame misguided Federal Reserve policies single-mindedly aimed at limiting "speculation" in the late 1920s.25 His analysis foreshadowed the later conclusions of Friedman and Schwartz in the 1960s and, more recently, of Field in the 1980s.26 But at the time he wrote, Currie was the exception. Classical economists argued that the problem was that wages were too high; labor-oriented economists such as Paul H. Douglas endorsed the wage-purchasing power theory and argued that the Depression had resulted from wages being too low. When the Taft-Hartley bill-which was to amend the Wagner Act substantially-was being debated after World War II, the issue of changing the Wagner preamble arose. The impetus for Taft-Hartley arose out of the postwar wave of strikes, and the strike issue was therefore much more central to the debate than the economic impact of collective bargaining. Although economic issues were discussed, the tenor of the discussions was very different than in 1934-35.
The original Hartley bill would have banned industry-wide bargaining, partly on the theory that such bargaining was inflationary because it pushed up wage costs. As part of this effort, the Wagner Act's preamble language dealing with wages and business depressions was deleted from Hartley's proposal.28 Wage boosts were seen as undesirable and those favoring banning industry-wide bargaining now had a new Brookings book to support their views.29 However, opponents of the bill cited the old Wagner theory. A ban on industry-wide bargaining, they argued, would lead to an inequality of bargaining power disadvantaging labor and possibly to depression.30
Senator Taft was more moderate than Congressman Hartley in the House; the Senate bill retained the basic wage-purchasing power theory of the old Wagner Act and did not ban industry-wide bargaining.31 Nonetheless, Taft's motivation in retaining the Wagner Act's language appeared to be based less on macroeconomic models than on a conservative approach of making as few changes as possible. Since the preamble's theory of wages and purchasing power had no legal significance, Taft saw no reason to change the wording. His statements gave no indication whether or not he personally subscribed to the theory.
Despite retention of the wage-purchasing power language, oppo- Various reasons can be suggested to explain the shift in Congress away from the view that the Wagner Act was an antidepression measure. First, there was no depression when Taft-Hartley was passed, despite many predictions that one would occur after the end of World War II. The absence of a depression naturally eroded interest in antidepression measures. Second, since inflation was seen as the major problem in the War's aftermath, concern over its abatement took precedence over worries about a new depression. After relative price stability was fostered by elaborate federal wage-price controls, retail prices rose by 8.5 percent in 1946 and by over 14 percent in 1947.33 Unions, freed from wage restraints, negotiated large, cross-industry pattern settlements and came to be seen as part of the inflation problem.
In addition to changes in the immediate economic background, there were changes occurring in the way macroeconomic policy was conceived. The Wagner Act's economic rationale-that pushing up wages would boost consumption and economic activity-was a preKeynesian notion. The essence of postwar Keynesianism was that government, not unions or businesses, had the major role in economic stabilization. Government was to carry out this responsibility through appropriate macroeconomic policies (the Keynesians emphasized fiscal policy), not by manipulating prices or wages directly.
At the time the Wagner Act was passed, Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money34 had yet to be published, and Keynesian ideas were just beginning to circulate. Although it is tempting to view New Deal fiscal policies as "Keynesian," the evidence suggests that Since the wage-purchasing power theory was never rigorously stated, critiquing it is difficult. A critic can always be accused of missing some subtle point. The reverse criticism can also be made, namely that economic policy in the 1930s was made without a clear-cut model of economic relationships. But even with these difficulties, it is possible to identify several inadequacies in the wage-purchasing power approach.
1. The wage-purchasing power theory.
The essence of the wage-purchasing model is simple. Labor's real share of national income can be defined as the nominal wage (W) times the amount of labor input (L) divided by a price index (P). If it is assumed that workers have a positive marginal propensity to consume out of their wage income, then anything which raises labor's real wage share should also raise real consumption. As consumption rises, the output needed to supply that consumption must also rise and, in turn, the amount of labor employed should increase. All elements of the The difficulty with this model is that it omits reference to pricing and production for nonconsumption goods. Note that labor's share is expressed in real terms (WL/P). If P rises due to the increase in labor costs, the positive impact of a nominal wage increase will tend to be offset. Furthermore, if increasing labor's share in national income squeezes the nonwage (profit) share, there could be negative effects on investment. An adequate model of the wage-purchasing power theory must account for these pricing and investment relationships. Such a model is substantially more complicated than the simple view represented in the Wagner Act's preamble.
Whether an augmented model which took account of pricing and investment relations would produce a positive employment impact following a nominal wage boost is unclear. Unconstrained by other considerations, such a model might well suggest that wage boosts would be offset by price boosts on the basis of a simple markup theory of pricing. Indeed, under the NIRA during the years 1933-35, wages and prices rose at parallel rates, leaving the real wage unchanged. This lack of growth in real wages coincided with a lack of productivity improvement. From 1935 to 1940, after passage of the Wagner Act and before World War II began to affect output, real wages rose at about two percent per annum, roughly paralleling the growth of productivity. In short, pricing during the post-1933 period seemed to be based on a markup over unit labor costs. Real wages rose when productivity rose and failed to rise when productivity was flat.39
Given this markup behavior, it is difficult to put much faith in a wage-led recovery story. Indeed, about half the real wage increase after 1935 occurred from 1935 to 1937, a period which ended in recession. Of course, these observations do not prove that the wage boosts did not have a net positive effect. One might argue that without union pressure, real wages might not have "captured" the productivity improvement and consumption might therefore have been depressed, causing the economy to slip backward even after 1937. These conclusions, however, do not leap out from the data.
Perhaps a greater cause for skepticism is the omission-even in the augmented model-of a financial monetary sector. If wage boosts lead to price boosts-even price boosts that are insufficient to prevent real wage growth-the real value of the money supply would decrease.
38. The tendency of the model to reinforce the initial wage effect on employment does not necessarily imply that any wage increase will set off an unending employment expansion. The model has a self-limiting multiplier action under reasonable assumptions.
39. Real wage increases are calculated from the national income accounts by deflating wages and salaries per full-time employee equivalent for the overall economy by the personal consumption deflator. Productivity is calculated from the ratio of real GNP to total full-time equivalent employment. Such a development could lead to an increase in real interest rates and a decrease in investment and-through multiplier effects-to reductions in other forms of economic activity. Again, it cannot be stated with absolute assurance that a wage increase must lead to decreased output and employment, even with a monetary effect included. Nevertheless, adding a monetary constraint does suggest that unless the monetary authorities accommodate the resulting inflation, real output and employment are likely to be retarded.
The outcome of a sudden boost in wages can be analyzed using a contemporary multiple equation econometric model. As is always the case, the results of such an experiment do not necessarily provide an accurate prediction of what would happen in the real world. Such models have built-in assumptions which may or may not be valid. Nevertheless, use of such a model will at least illustrate the moder consensus view of economists concerning the results of a sudden burst of wage push inflation.
One such model is the DRI annual scenario model, which contains 191 equations focusing on the national income accounts and other commonly forecasted variables, such as unemployment and inflation. The model was used to simulate the effects of a 10 percent increase in wage push in 1985.40 Since, in the model, wage increases feed into prices and back into wages, the immediate effect was an increase in wages by a little more than 11 percent above what would otherwise have been predicted. Inflation-as measured by the GNP deflatorrose by about six and one-half percentage points. Real consumption expenditures rose slightly but overall real GNP declined by about 0.7 percent in the first year. This drop was due to a decrease in real investment triggered by falling real profits and rising interest rates. Finally, unemployment tended to rise, partly due to the employment drop and partly because the model assumes that higher real wages attract a greater supply of job seekers.
As noted, the above simulation does not disprove the Wagner Act's wage-purchasing power theory. Indeed, although most economic indicators in the model continue to deteriorate after the initial shock, some do not.41 However, even given the limitations in the model, the 40. Professor Larry J. Kimbell of the U.C.L.A. Business Forecasting Project was kind enough to make the described simulation for me. The simulation was made on the assumption of an unchanged monetary policy defined as the growth in the level of nonborrowed reserves in Federal Reserve member banks. A 10% increase in wage push was simulated as an addition to the constant term for 1985 only in the wage-change equation so that, given initial conditions, wages would rise 10 percentage points more than otherwise. Since initial conditions are changed by the wage boost, the actual jump in wage inflation is above 10 percentage points.
41. For example, according to the model, real GNP is 2.7% below the level otherwise forecasted after two years. But the inflation effect tends to taper off: The GNP deflator increases after two years by less than three percentage points above its otherwise forecasted value. The employment effect is the most ambiguous because the model assumes a significant deterioration in productivity performance due to the induced recession. Employment is Wagner Act's economic assumptions can no longer be accepted uncritically. The most dramatic effect is a burst of inflation from the costpush pressures of the initial wage shock. Such a result would undoubtedly goad the monetary authorities into taking restrictive-i.e., demand-depressing-measures. With the greater willingness in 1985 as opposed to 1935 to use macroeconomic policy, especially monetary policy, in pursuit of economic objectives, the view that wage boosts are inevitably beneficial can no longer be the assumption underlying national labor relations policy.
Wages and monetary policy.
In the modern world, the monetary authority, such as the Federal Reserve in the United States, cannot be viewed as merely a passive reactor to wage trends. Monetary policy is actively used to regulate economic activity and, even more extensively, to restrain inflation. One can debate the wisdom or effectiveness with which such policies are pursued, but the fact that they are pursued is undeniable. Thus, a full model of the impact of wage increases on economic activity must take account of the responses of monetary policy to wage inflation.
The importance of monetary policy is particularly well illustrated by events of the period between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. During the late 1970s, price and wage inflation accelerated as the economy expanded after the severe recession of the mid-1970s. This acceleration was exacerbated by political turmoil in Iran, the fall of the Shah, and the resultant OPEC oil price increases which rattled the U.S. economy in 1979 and 1980.
During the expansion of the late 1970s, discussion in the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee-the committee which sets monetary policy-began to focus on wage developments. The minutes of a Committee meeting in August 1977 record the concern "that businesses did not appear to be pressing as actively as they might to hold labor costs down, fearing the impact of strikes and assuming that inflation would continue."42 In February 1978, minutes of the Committee indicate that some members believed that wage increases were abnormally large, given underlying economic conditions.43 By April of that year, the Committee expressed fears that the wage settlement in the coal industry-following a well-publicized strike-could cause accelerating wage inflation if it "were viewed as a pattern-setter."44 And at its slightly below otherwise forecasted levels the first year, slightly above in the second year, and slightly below in the third year. Real consumption falls below otherwise forecasted levels after the first year. July 1978 meeting, the Committee looked ahead to the 1979 bargaining round with trepidation, fearing that "strong pressures for large increases in wages would tend to spread throughout the economy."45 During the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve also began to articulate an inflation expectations theory which was then circulating among many policy oriented economists. According to this theory, a period of prolonged inflation causes expectations of further inflation. These expectations reinforce inflation because they lead to programmed increases in wages and prices designed to "keep up" with price and cost trends. Examples of such expectation-generated increases can be found in the case of long-term contracts, the most prominent of which occur in the collective bargaining sector where agreements typically run two to three years. Closely linked to the expectations theory was the proposition that the U.S. economy was prone to the establishment of a self-perpetuating wage-price spiral.
Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market
The flationary pressure.54 Some thought that use of incomes policy-e.g., wage-price guidelines, social accords, and similar devices-could supplement an anti-inflationary monetary policy and make the disinflation adjustment less painful. In the end, however, brute force-two back-toback recessions in the early 1980s-was the main vehicle of adjustment. The cost was high-unemployment reached levels in excess of 10 percent in 1982. But inflation ultimately dropped substantially.
There is a lesson to be learned from the painful disinflation of the early 1980s. It is that a wage-oriented role for unions as envisioned in the Wagner Act risks putting organized labor on a collision course with monetary policy. Given the strong public sentiment against permitting inflation to go unchecked, it is labor which suffers from such a collision. leagues had good reason to be skeptical about then-existing company unions and representation plans.57 By banning such arrangements, however, they moved the U.S. along a path different from that of countries in which employer-sponsored consultation mechanisms are required by law.58 Since wage-centered unionism was to be the centerpiece of American labor relations policy, topics other than narrow workplace issues were implicitly taken off the table.
At the time, this position was also characteristic of those employers who found themselves forced to deal with unions. To the extent that unions sought to widen the scope of bargaining, management was likely to resist. This attitude became especially apparent during World War II. Leaders in certain CIO unions saw the war effort, and the resulting emphasis on output and cooperation, as a chance to widen the scope of bargaining to include more traditional management prerogatives. Plans were put forward for joint production committees amidst rhetoric emphasizing the common interests of labor and management.59 But management saw these proposals as potential intrusions into areas which had formerly been considered off-limits for labor. Management feared that wartime concessions might lead to postwar loss of control of the enterprise.
In defense of its conservative stance, management could point to the Wagner Act's seemingly narrow definition of the scope of bargaining. But the vagueness of the Wagner Act with regard to the scope of bargaining was a problem. In the view of the management community, changes were needed to prevent the NLRB and the courts from widening that scope. Ultimately, the debate focused on defining who was a "supervisor."
In an adversarial, wage-bargaining relationship, top management must be able to rely on its lieutenants. Thus, the NLRB's inconsistency on the issue of whether foremen could unionize infuriated the management community. Management viewed foremen as their front line and unionization of foremen was seen as encouraging traitorous behavior. In response to the concerns of management, Taft-Hartley carefully defined "supervisory employee" in order to keep foremen out of bargaining units.60
The Historians can be left to wrestle with that issue, but the crucial fact is that wage-oriented unionism-endorsed by the original Wagner Actwas solidified by Taft-Hartley and by the management reaction to labor unrest. Participation by unions outside the traditional areas of workplace concerns was not encouraged. Unions were not to involve themselves in managerial decisions or worry about the firm's economic condition. The narrow scope of bargaining that arose in the 1940s hinders innovative approaches to wage setting. In particular, the concept of gain sharing-discussed in Section III below-remains difficult for unions and managements to accept, since it inevitably raises issues of wider union participation in management.
Postwar trends.
The passage of Taft-Hartley and the management policy of containment coincided with the end of the growth in the unionization ratethat is, in the proportion of the workforce that was unionized. After the Korean War, the unionization rate declined, gradually during the 1960s, more rapidly in the late 1970s, and drastically during the early 1980s. Drawing causal relations is always risky, but some common themes run through these phases.64
As already noted, the postwar strike wave in 1946 was a major factor in the passage of Taft-Hartley. Wage pressures seemed to spur management into response. The period after the Korean War was characterized by a widening of the union/nonunion wage differential and breakthroughs in certain benefit areas, notably supplemental unemployment benefit plans.65 By the end of the 1950s, Congress had passed another piece of union-opposed legislation: the Landrum-Griffin Act. Also in the late 1950s, an upward trend developed in both the 64. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has varied its data collection procedure with regard to union membership and representation. According to BLS estimates based on membership surveys, union members accounted for 34-36% of nonagricultural payroll employment immediately after World War II. Thereafter, the ratio fell somewhat, but it rose again to roughly the post-World War II level immediately after the Korean War. By 1970, calculated on the same basis, the ratio had declined to about 27%. During the 1960s, however, certain employee associations-mainly in the public sector-had adopted union-like bargaining functions. Including those organizations raises the 1970 figure to 30%. By 1980, however, the figure had declined to about 25%. Since 1980, the BLS has relied on the Current Population Survey for estimates of unionization. In 1980, the CPS data indicated that about 26% of wage and salary workers were represented by unions (including non-members in bargaining units). number of successful suits for employer unfair labor practices and the number of workers ordered reinstated by the NLRB.66 As in the 1940s, developments in the workplace and in bargaining seemed to trigger a management reaction. The upward trend in employer unfair labor practices actions and worker reinstatement orders accelerated around 1970. This acceleration followed a period in the late 1960s in which strike activity increased noticeably, contract rejections seemingly became more common, and the union/nonunion wage differential again widened.67 As before, workplace problems and bargaining developments seemed to have wider implications than the immediate settlements they produced. Managerial attitudes toughened: Nonunion firms became more resistant to unionization efforts while union organized firms sought ways to avoid unionization at new locations.
By 1984, that estimate had declined to just under 22%. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 412 (Bulletin 2070) (1980); BUREAU OF LA-BOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, press release USDL 81-435, Sept. 3, 1981 (as corrected by USDL 81-446, Sept. 18, 1981); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EARN-INGS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZED WORKERS (May 1980) (Bulletin 2105) (1981); Flaim, New Data on Union Members and their Earnings, in 32 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
This process repeated in the 1970s. Union/nonunion wage differentials widened,68 supporting management impressions that avoiding unionization was economically prudent. Management pressure defeated an attempt in 1978 by organized labor to counter management's union-avoidance tactics by amending the Wagner-Taft-Hartley framework. Substantial declines in union membership followed in the early 1980s-declines much larger than can be explained by hard times in the older "smokestack" industries.69
In short, unions found themselves in a "Catch-22" situation. Management's primary goal in the 1940s was to keep unions focused on wages and related workplace issues and away from matters management considered its own prerogative. Unions acquiesced and concentrated on wage and benefit issues. The more successfully they did so, the more they galvanized management resistance and fostered their own decline. Short run success meant long-term failure. prices to rise?" But interesting as that question sounds, it diverts attention from the true dilemma of macroeconomic policy.
Since union members have always represented a minority of the workforce, it is evident that they cannot be the sole source of inflation. In fact, most wage decisions are made in nonunion settings. Thus, even if inflation is attributed to wage developments-a questionable proposition in most periods-the blame must be placed largely on nonunion employers.
The main periods of postwar inflation are the late 1940s, the late 1960s, and the mid-to-late 1970s. It is difficult to put the blame for inflation on wages in these periods. In the late 1940s, the key factor was pent-up demand, promoted by monetary expansion and military spending during World War II, and only temporarily contained by wartime wage-price controls. Inflation in the late 1960s was also driven by monetary and fiscal expansion, this time resulting from the Vietnam War and development of social programs under the Great Society. Finally, the 1970s saw two OPEC oil price shocks, dollar devaluation, and stimulation from macroeconomic policy. Different economists will weigh these factors differently and will prefer to tell the story in accord with their prior theoretical beliefs. But the basic message-that wages, union or otherwise, were not the basic causes of these inflationary periods-is not widely debated.
The important question, however, is not whether unions cause inflation but whether the interaction of the wage determination system (of which unions are an important part) with anti-inflation macroeconomic policy makes it difficult to halt inflation. The continuation of inflation, not its initial cause, is the key issue.
There is a problem in the interaction between monetary policy and wage determination; wage setting practices make inflation restraint an unnecessarily painful process. But unions could play a role in improving macroeconomic performance. Such a role would lead unions away from the wage-centered system imbedded in the Wagner-Taft-Hartley framework, a system whose long term characteristics have already been seen to contribute to the institutional crisis now facing the labor movement.
A. The Current Wage System. Wage setting today consists primarily of establishing a nominal wage rate (a wage expressed in dollar terms) based on a period of time (an hour, a week, a month, or a year), or, in some cases, based on a certain amount of work accomplished (a "piece" rate). In the union sector, this nominal wage is often partially protected against inflation through a cost of living adjustment clause (COLA clause) and by periodic wage adjustments over the contract's life. In the nonunion sector, COLA clauses are quite rare. Wage decisions, however, are made as fre-quently as management desires (often annually) and so can reflect inflation if management wishes.
The current wage system would not seem foreign to Senator Wagner, were he alive. He probably would be impressed by COLA clauses and long term contracts in the union sector; these features were known, but much less common, in the 1930s.70 And he undoubtedly would be surprised by the expansion of fringe benefits. However, he would be quite at home with one basic element: the fact that a wage is chosen, either unilaterally by management or through collective bargaining, and remains in place for some time. During that period, management assesses business conditions and determines how many workers to hire at that wage. In other words, the primary short run response to changes in economic conditions is made by management through layoffs and new hiring.
It is this mode of response which is at the root of the modern macroeconomic dilemma. Since the end of World War II, economic downturns typically have been deliberately "engineered" to restrain inflation. However, the main impact of an engineered demand restriction, a "tight" monetary policy for instance, is primarily a decrease in production and employment and only secondarily a decrease in inflation. Wages are set by a variety of factors-such as the need to keep up with other employers or to catch up with past inflation-but they are not closely linked with demand conditions facing the employer. If demand is depressed for a sufficiently long period-as the experience of the early 1980s demonstrated-inflationary pressures will eventually subside, but only after a considerable price has been paid in terms of lost output and unemployment.71
The wage system's basic outline was already present when the Wagner Act was passed.72 However, the NIRA codes, the Wagner Act, and other legislation of the period reinforced the notion of fixing the wage-or pushing it up-even in the face of adverse economic circumstances. Statistical evidence shows that wage flexibility diminished after 71. Okun estimated that raising the unemployment rate by one percentage point for a year would not produce more than a 0.5% reduction in the inflation rate. Although precise estimates will vary depending on the period considered, this estimate is still within the range of current thinking. See Okun, Efficient Disinflationary Policies, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 348 (1978) .
72. The Wagner Act ratified and helped solidify trends that were already apparent in 1935. But just as the legal system surrounding labor relations ratified one set of arrangements, it can now be modified to favor an alternative system. There are signs today of increased interest in gain sharing on the part of both labor and management. This article suggests that steps should be taken to amplify this new interest. Workers' preferences for stable income flows have undoubtedly contributed to the existing wage system in which labor costs are varied primarily by layoffs and hiring rather than by flexible compensation arrangements. But the evidence of the post-World War II period shows that tax incentives can move wage setters to install a wide variety of compensation plans. For example, employer-provided fringe benefits and the recent surge in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) owe much to tax incentives. the 1930s.73 And there seems to have been a decided disinterest during the postwar period in setting wages according to the employer's "ability to pay" as an alternative to the contemporary wage system.
Using ability-to-pay as a determinant of employee compensation is not directly in conflict with the Wagner Act, but neither is it supported by the Act's underlying economic model. Before the 1920s, the use of ability-to-pay as a wage criterion seemed to have been more acceptable than it was after the 1930s. In describing criteria that might be used in wage disputes by arbitrators, Herbert Feis argued in 1924: "[I]f on the one hand, the particular industry concerned is in a much poorer condition than most others, caution should be used in increasing wages; while if its condition is better than most others, more than ordinary advances may be undertaken."74 After World War II, however, this view faded. For example, in 1947 the noted Harvard economist, Sumner Slichter severely criticized the use of ability-to-pay as a wage criterion, arguing that it would amount to "subsidizing inefficiency" since less profitable employers would pay less.75 Bernstein's 1954 study of criteria used by arbitrators in the postwar period suggested that the "financial condition" of the employer was likely to be given little weight except when that condition was extremely grave and a substantial employment reduction would otherwise have resulted.76
There is a certain logic to this view in the collective bargaining context. Union contracts typically give great weight to seniority. When layoffs occur, only the junior employees are affected, unless the economic situation is especially severe. Since unions are political institutions, it is not surprising that the more senior workers-the "median voters" in the union's political process-are the key determinants of wage and layoff policies.77 In periods of relatively minor economic fluctuations, the median voter will see no reason to permit his or her wage to fluctuate merely to cushion junior employees. Thus, the wage concessions of the early 1980s occurred only when mass layoffs, plant closings, and bankruptcies threatened the median voter in certain industries.78 Since unions after World War II became pace setters for 
B. The Macroeconomics of Gain Sharing
Despite general postwar disinterest in anything but the standard wage system, some employers have long used alternative pay systems. In particular, profit sharing has a lengthy history going back to the midnineteenth century.80 Under profit sharing schemes, ability to pay is automatically reflected in labor compensation through fluctuations in the profit-sharing bonus. Labor compensation (wage plus bonus) is thereby made responsive to the firm's economic condition.
In some countries, notably Japan, variable bonus payments are a substantially larger part of total compensation than they are in the U.S.81 The Japanese example is particularly interesting since that country has exhibited both a lower and a more stable rate of unemployment than has the U.S.82 Demand restrictions inJapan reduce inflation more efficiently and less painfully than does the U.S. wage system.
It is difficult to estimate precisely how many U.S. workers participate in true profit sharing plans. Many firms have retirement programs which they term "profit sharing" in order to escape the regulatory rigors of conventional pension plans while simultaneously claiming pension-like tax benefits. Nevertheless, a 1983 survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that roughly one-fourth of the employees of medium-to-large firms had plans described as profit sharing.83 However, the exclusion of smaller firms meant that many private wage and salary workers were omitted from the survey. There are no data indicating the proportion of small firms which have profit sharing plans, but it is likely that it is substantially below one-fourth. Whatever the exact figure in these categories, true profit sharing remains an uncommon form of compensation in the American workplace. Profit sharing is often justified as a means of improving employee morale and productivity. These effects may possibly occur. If they were certain to occur, profit sharing obviously would be more widespread than it is. Unfortunately, profit sharing has also been used as part of a campaign by nonunion employers to keep from organizing their workforces. This history has led to union antipathy toward the profit sharing alternative.84 Until quite recently, the macroeconomic side of profit sharing (and other forms of gain sharing) has been neglected.
In the modern world, job seekers often spend considerable time searching for new employment.85 Typically, the financial burden of this search is borne largely by the job seeker. Of course, a laid-off worker will often be eligible for unemployment benefits. Other family members may also bring in some income. Nevertheless, the unemployed worker's income is reduced during the job search, which is often long and frustrating.
There are some exceptions to the rule that the unemployed worker does the searching. Door-to-door sales personnel, for example, are often actively sought by employers. In May 1985 the Los Angeles Times reported that the item the Fuller Brush Company was most eager to sell was ajob with Fuller Brush as a sales representative.86 Sales firms such as Fuller Brush behave differently from most other companies for a variety of reasons. Door-to-door sales personnel are paid on a commission basis. They receive a share of the sales they generate and their employer collects the remainder. Thus, it always pays for the employer to add more sales personnel, since the percentage going to the employer is sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing the item being sold. More employees mean more sales and, therefore, more profits. It is the form of the compensation system, the share contract, which produces this result. With a fixed time-based wage, additional sales personnel would also bring in more sales, but because of diminishing marginal returns, the employer would want to hire a limited number of salespersons.87 [Vol. 38:1065
In general, a compensation system based on sharing-of profits, revenues, or sales-gives the employer an incentive to hire larger numbers of employees. Martin Weitzman describes an economy of firms operating on a gain sharing compensation system as one composed of labor-seeking "vacuum cleaners" which would suck up unemployed workers and keep the economy at full employment.88 The difficulty lies in making the transition from the current wage system to one with more gain sharing.
For the Weitzman approach to operate effectively, most major employers would have to shift toward a gain sharing form of compensation. Fuller Brush cannot be expected to solve the nation's economic problems by itself! As a single firm operating within a larger wage system, the people it hires end up working at lower and lower effective wages. But if a majority of firms operated in a gain sharing mode, competition among them for labor would help keep wages from declining. Unions can play a role in determining the terms of the sharing arrangement.
Even at the level of an individual firm, however, there is a connection between wage responsiveness to demand (through gain sharing or otherwise) and job security. A firm's payroll equals its average wage (W) multiplied by the amount of labor employed (L). A firm which finds it necessary to reduce its payroll by five percent, for example, will be indifferent between a five percent reduction in L (the layoff approach) or a five percent reduction in W.89 In the early 1980s, unions found themselves confronted with such trade-offs, and some adopted profit sharing as a way of adding more flexibility to W in exchange for less variability in L.
The interplay between wage-setting and monetary policy is fairly clear. When the Federal Reserve puts on the monetary brakes, it slows wage and price inflation. The faster the reduction in wage inflation, the shorter the recessions need to be. Making wages more responsive to demand conditions by encouraging gain sharing would aid macroeconomic policy, reduce the need for deliberately engineered unemployment, and-as the Japanese experience suggests-stabilize the economy. While Senator Wagner and his colleagues believed that wage responsiveness to demand aggravated economic fluctuations, macroeconomic policy has made the reverse true. More gain sharing would reduce the intensity of the business cycle and keep the economy closer to full employment. Firms became less willing to guarantee periodic wage increases. Beginning in 1983, a growing proportion of contract settlements featured fixed, lump-sum bonus payments instead of annual improvement factors. Where competitive wage pressures were intense, bargainers increasingly adopted "two-tier" wage plans, permitting lower wage rates for newly hired workers.91
Finally, the use of profit sharing was, for the first time, given serious consideration in the union sector and was adopted in some prominent agreements.92 Various assurances regarding job security often accompanied these profit sharing plans. The link between job security and profit sharing was a logical development.
A paradoxical mixture of conflict and cooperation accompanied these developments in wage determination. Some managers-encouraged by changes in the economic and political setting-took an especially hard line with their unions, in some cases breaking strikes and hiring nonunion replacements for their workforces.93 Others, particularly in situations where a hard line approach was unlikely to be successful, emphasized cooperation and participation. A variety of "quality of worklife" initiatives flowered.
Within the union movement itself, a previously unknown degree of 93. An often cited example was Continental Airlines, which abrogated its labor agreements in a bankruptcy proceeding and rehired a nonunion workforce in 1983.
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[Vol. 38:1065 introspection and self-criticism developed. The AFL-CIO, whose leaders had become increasingly disenchanted with the Wagner-Taft-Hartley legal framework, began to search for alternative roles for unions.94 Thus, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Wagner Act, there is a receptiveness to change in many areas.
Periods of receptiveness to change do not occur frequently. When they do, it is often in response to some trauma. Psychological research indicates that even when change comes in such circumstances, it can easily be reversed unless reinforced and supported.95 At present, despite the discussion of change in industrial relations circles, and despite some examples of change as a result of concession bargaining, public policy makers have given these matters little serious review. The Wagner- Taft The best that can be said for these programs is that given contemporary wage-setting institutions they may, under ideal circumstances, have some influence on expectations of inflation and notions of what the "normal" rate of wage adjustment should be. The difficulty is that circumstances are often not ideal, making programs of direct intervention extremely prone to demolition by external forces such as foreign oil price increases.
Frustration over the high costs of inflation restraint through traditional monetary policy, and over the inability of direct intervention programs to improve economic performance in the 1960s and 1970s, has led to the search for alternatives. Some economists have proposed that multiyear union contracts should be banned, arguing that wage settlements under one-year agreements would be more responsive to demand conditions.99 But even if this hypothesis were correct, there would be severe opposition to any such proposal-especially from the management community-because one-year contracts increase the risk of strikes.
Other economists have proposed using taxes and subsidies to "bribe" wage setters into conforming their behavior to anti-inflation standards. Such "tax-based incomes policies" (TIPs) are easy to formulate in the abstract, but extremely hard to design in practice because of the complexity of incorporating all the institutional features of wage setting into the Internal Revenue Code. A Carter Administration TIP proposal-which would have provided tax credits for complying workers contingent on price inflation-was ultimately rejected by Congress because of its complexity and uncertain cost.100
The lesson of these efforts is that fundamental institutional reform is needed, not some quick-fix gimmick. The positive trends already in evidence need to be reinforced. Since there is growing interest in gain sharing, efforts should be channeled toward developing and implementing effective and comprehensive gain sharing programs.
It should be evident that gain sharing in the unionized sector must inevitably involve a higher degree of labor-management cooperation than has been the norm. If, for example, an important component of worker pay is to be derived from profit sharing, it is inevitable that unions will become concerned with access to the accounts from which profit estimates are derived. Thus, gain sharing and information sharing are linked. Indeed, the thought of having to share information has historically inhibited management interest in profit sharing.1'0
The likelihood is that if profit sharing becomes an important source of compensation, union interest will spread beyond mere information and toward the management decision-making process itself. While the overall business cycle is an important determinant of aggregate profitability, the fate of each firm's profits is also critically dependent on the quality of its management decisions. Workers dependent upon profit sharing will want to be represented in those decisions. The sharp demarcation between labor and management that is part of the WagnerTaft-Hartley framework will be challenged in a gain sharing economy.
Even where no form of gain sharing exists, unions and employers have been showing increased interest in quality of worklife initiatives, typically involving some degree of worker participation in management decisions. The further such experiments develop, the more logical it will become for those who contribute in making decisions to share in the fruits-sweet or bitter-of those decisions.'02 Simply by building on these tendencies, public policy can tilt wage setting toward a gain sharing approach.
Tax credits for appropriate gain sharing plans are the most obvious way to promote needed reform. Even in a period of concern about fed- eral budget deficits, considerable incentives could be provided simply by directing current tax expenditures on profit sharing toward those plans that are actually contingent on profits. Plans which are termed "profit sharing" but have no precise profit-based formulas should not be rewarded, as they currently are, by favorable tax treatment. Similarly, the tax provisions that heavily promote Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) need to be reexamined and better targeted to promote true gain sharing. Except in the few cases of complete worker ownership, many ESOPs simply spread stock around without changing wage responsiveness to demand or internal employment incentives. They frequently are little more than tax-advantaged schemes to obtain financing.
Even with appropriate tax incentives in place, however, there is still the intangible, but extremely important, element of the "climate" for basic reform of wage-setting institutions. Perhaps the place to start to improve this climate would be to delete the second paragraph of the Wagner Act's preamble 103 and substitute the following language:
Equalization of bargaining power between employees and employers is the objective of this Act. Such bargaining can promote the flow of commerce at a high employment level and reduce inflationary pressures by developing gain sharing payment plans whereby employee compensation reflects to a significant extent the economic circumstances of the employer. The development of gain sharing will be fostered by increased sharing of information and decisionmaking by employers with their employees and labor organizations.
IV. CONCLUSION
American wage setting arrangements evolved over a long period of time. But the 1930s were a critical period in this evolution. Passage of the Wagner Act and related legislation put an official seal of approval on a system of wage rigidity. A dubious theory of wage-purchasing power-embedded in the Act-suggested that the appropriate response for wage setters in depression and recession was to push wage rates up, or at least prevent them from falling.
After World War II, the advent of active, anti-inflation monetary policy made the wage-purchasing power approach completely obsolete. Wage insensitivity to demand put collective bargainers on a collision course with the Federal Reserve, an outcome which has adversely affected the labor movement. Yet the focus of the union movement on wages and benefits in the postwar period was encouraged by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act through its emphasis on management rights. Adoption of gain sharing plans, such as profit sharing, would reintroduce needed flexibility in wage setting and improve macroeconomic performance. At the same time, it would inevitably expand union interest and concern into previously held management prerogatives. While the amended Wagner Act does not forbid such a development, it also does not encourage it. Hence, it is suggested that-along with needed tax incentives for gain sharing-the preamble of the Wagner Act should be amended explicitly to endorse gain sharing. Gain sharing should become an important part of U.S. labor relations policy.
